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REAL PROPERTY
HERMAN L.TRAUTMAN*

The Tennessee cases in the fields of Real Property and Future Interests have been quite abundant during the period' covered by this
Survey. Because of the number of cases and the very interesting and
novel problems presented in some of them, and because the scope of the
law of Future Interests includes cases which involve Wills and Personal Property as well as Real Property, it is believed that the reader
will find it more feasible to consider the Future Interest cases in a
separate article appearing in this Survey. Therefore, notwithstanding
some overlapping, the emphasis of this article will be limited to those
Real Property cases decided during the Survey period which do not
depend wholly upon principles of the law of Future Interests.
I. TiTL s
Champertous Deeds: There were two cases, Young v. Unknown
Heirs of Little2 and Frumin v. May, 3 which involved the statutory prohibition against champertous conveyances. Of these two, the one which
brings into focus the need for a clear definition of the basic substantive
concept of champertous deeds is the Young case. This opinion referred
4
to a previous opinion rendered by the same court in this case in 1949.
Because of the rather involved fact situation, the case will be stated in
detail after a preliminary consideration of the statutory principle.
In accord with the sixteenth century English Pretended Title Act,5
the Tennessee statutory rule is that a deed of conveyance executed
and delivered by a title owner while the land is held in the adverse possession of another is "utterly void."'6 Prior to the Statute of
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar. Grateful acknowledgement is made of the helpful research assistance of Mr. James
C. Kirby, Jr., of Old Hickory, Tennessee, formerly a student at Vanderbilt Law
School and now a Root-Tilden Scholar at the New York University School of
Law.
1. The scope of this Survey is limited to those decisions of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee and the Court of Appeals of Tennessee and those decisions
of the federal courts rendered in cases from Tennessee which were published
between June. 1, 1952, and June 1, 1953.
2. 249 S.W.2d 580 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
3. 251 S.W.2d 314 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
4. Young v. Little's Unknown Heirs, 34 Tenn. App. 39, 232 S.W.2d 614
(E.S. 1949).
5. 32 HENRY VIII, c. 9 (1540).
6. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 7823, 7824 (Williams 1934); Kitchen-Miller Co. v.
Kern. 170 Tenn. 10, 91 S.W.2d 291 (1936); Green v. Cumberland Coal & Coke
Co., 110 Tenn. 35, 38, 72 S.W.459, 460 (1903); Bullard v. Copps, 21 Tenn. 408,
37 Am. Dec. 561 (1841). But cf. Ferguson v. Prince, 136 Tenn. 543, 190 S.W.
548 (1916); Key v. Snow, 90 Tenn. 663, 18 S.W. 251 (1891); Ruffin v. Johnson,
52 Tenn. 604 (1871); Nance's Lessee v. Thompson, 33 Tenn. 320, 327 (1853);
1080
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Uses (1535), when livery of seisin was essential to the conveyance of a
legal freehold interest in land, it was considered impractical and perhaps legally impossible to attempt to make livery, with its attendant
community publicity, when the land was in the adverse possession of
another. 7 But the Statute of Uses made possible the conveyance of
a legal freehold interest in land by informal and private agreement
between persons who might be many miles distant from the land, without the trouble of going to the land and making a formal entry for the
performance of the ritual of livery of seisin. When the publicity of
livery of seisin was thus abolished by operation of the Statute of Uses,
and when the Statute of Enrollments as an experiment in the public
recording of land transfers failed as a substitute in this respect, it was
understandable that there was enacted in England in 1540 a Pretended
Title Act,8 making it unlawful to buy or sell a purported right or title
to real property of which the vendor had not been in possession personally or by tenant throughout the preceding year.9 This statute is
often spoken of as an affirmance of the common law,10 but it certainly
went further than the earlier law and actually made bad some conveyances which at common law would have been good. By the earlier
law, an adverse possessor did not have to be in possession for a year
before making a conveyance, but after this statute he had to be so. By
the earlier law, the true owner did not have to wait a year after he
re-entered before conveying, yet by a literal construction of this statute
he was required to do just that, though a more liberal construction was
advocated in Tennessee."
The mischief at which the act was aimed "was that individuals possessed of rights, real or pretended, transferred them to persons more
able, or more disposed, than themselves to litigate them. This was considered to be a great evil.' 2 Chancellor Kent attempted to state the
public policy of the doctrine to be "the general sense and usage of
mankind, that the transfer of real property should not be valid, unless
the grantor hath the capacity, as well as the intention, to deliver posWilson & Wheeler v. Nance & Collins, 30 Tenn. 188 (1850); Stockton v. Murray,
25 Tenn. App. 371, 157 S.W.2d 859 (M.S. 1941), for the all-important qualification which Tennessee equity courts have engrafted upon this common lawstatutory rule in accord with all other states in the United States except Kentucky and Connecticut.
7. That it might have been legally possible to do this, see Costigan, The
Conveyance of Lands by One Whose Lands Are in the Adverse Possession
of Another, 19 HARV. L. REV. 267, 271-275 (1906).
8. See note 5 supra.
9. See Costigan, supra note 7, at 275. The statute provided both civil and
criminal sanctions to such an attempted transfer.
10. 6 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 3043 (Perm. ed. 1940); 5 TIFrANY, REAL
PROPERTY § 1331 (3d ed., Jones, 1939).
11. Kincaid v. Meadows, 40 Tenn. 188 (1859); Whiteside v.- Martin, 15 Tenn.
283 (1835).
12. Costigan, supra note 7, at 276, quoting Maule, J., in Doe d. Williams v.
Evans, 1 C.B. 717, 135 Eng. Rep. 724 (1845).
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session2. 5 Blackstone stated the reason of the rule to be "lest pretended.titles might be granted to great men, whereby justice might be
trodden .down, and the weak oppressed.' 4 But a Tennessee federal
judge in 1893 proposed as a better explanation for the Tennessee statutes that."[I]t was no fear of nobles or great men, or their influence
with courts and juries, that produced these Tennessee statutes ... but
it was the hostility of public sentiment to the 'land sharks' who were
speculating in litigation over defective titles, and particularly to lawyers lending themselves to this speculation for profit, which provoked
statutes seeking to enlarge the English acts just because they did not
reach the evil sought to be suppressed." (emphasis supplied) 15
This early English statutory doctrine has received only a small recognition in the United States.16 The doctrine of seisin consisted of physical possession of a freehold interest in land plus the relational rights,
powers, privileges and duties of political, social and economic significance inherent in the feudal system. Commercial transactions in land
were few and far between in the feudal society, and the principal emphasis of litigation among those in that society was on possession. In
the United States, the general abandonment of the significance of
seisin and the heavy emphasis in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries- on the reliability of public record titles to safeguard banking
and commercial transactions in land by people not in actual physical
possession have resulted in an entirely different situation. The "pests
of civil society"'17 in the United States today are not those who seek
the ascertainment of true ownership under a clear record title, but
rather are those intentional wrongdoers who seek to gain a legal right
by the commission of a legal wrong when they enclose a quarter of an
acre on the back side of a mountain under a spurious deed covering the
whole -mountain, which is nevertheless sufficient to provide color of
title18 and "constructive" adverse possession to the whole. 19 The result
13. 4 KENT's Comm. *448, cited with approval in Wilson & Wheeler v. Nance
& Collins, 30 Tenn. 188 (1850), and Ruffin v. Johnson, 52 Tenn. 604 (1871).
14. See 6 THOMPsON, REAL PROPERTY § 3043 (Perm. ed. 1940).
15. Hammond, J., in Byrne v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & M.R.R., 55 Fed. 44, 47
(C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1893).
16. See Note, 35 L.R.A. (N.s.) 729 (1912). This comprehensive note indicates
that by 1911 only two American jurisdictions remained in which the champerty
rule was still in force as a common law principle and that in only five states,
including Tennessee, were there then statutes prohibiting the transfer of the
true owner's interest during adverse possession.
17. See Hammond, J., supra note 15, at 46, quoting Blackstone.
18. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8582 (Williams 1934).
19. See Kitchen-Miller Co. v. Kern, 170 Tenn. 10, 91 S.W.2d 291 (1936);
Green v. Cumberland Coal & Coke Co., 110 Tenn. 35, 38, 72 S.W. 459, 460
(1903). It is not without significance that most of the cases involving the

champerty rule in Tennessee seem to have come from East Tennessee where
the mountain terrain would seem to make the detection of squatters or trespassers in a cove on the land less likely. When difficulty of detection is com* bined with the rule that it does not require any length of adverse possession
to make a conveyance by the true owner champertious, see Bullard v. Copps,
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has been that, in the few jurisdictions where the doctrine had*gained
recognition as a rule of law,20 the courts of equity have modified the
rule by holding that the deed of a grantor out of possessiory is not absolutely void, but void only as against the adverse claimant ir possession. It is good as between the parties and persons. standing in
privity with them; and the grantee is entitled, even as against the adverse possessor, to bring an action in the name of the grantor to recover
the land; and if the grantor recovers possession of the land from :the
adverse possessor, it inures to the benefit of the grantee in the "champertous" deed. 21 Furthermore, the rule of law itself has been held to
have no application to judicial transfers, transfers by operation of law,
conveyances made in performance of an executory contract.entered
into before the adverse posession, conveyances made by the state and
correction deeds. 22 Thus, the limited recognition gained by the harsh
champerty rule of law seems to have been abolished. either by. statute
3
or court decision in all of the states except Kentucky and Connecticut.2
That its tendency is to increase rather than decrease litigation would
seem clear from the long line of discriminating cases involving the
rule to be found in the General and Decennial Digests from Kentucky

alone.
Recent Tennessee cases have not always made it clear that the harsh
words of the statutory prohibition have been substantially modified by

a long line of nationally recognized Tennessee equity cases 24-:holding
that the transfer is good as between the grantor and the grantee*and

all persons in privity with them; that the grantee is entitled to-sue in
the name of the grantor; and that, if the grantor recovers possession
from the adverse possessor, it inures to the benefit. of the grantee.. This
21 Tenn. 408, 37 Am. Dec. 561 (1841), the potentiality of harassment and risk
to commercial dealings in land can be better appreciated.
20. See Bordwell, Seisin and Disseisin, 34 H~Av. L. REV. 717, 734-36 (1921).
21. Ferguson v. Prince, 136 Tenn. 543, 190 S.W. 548 (1916); Key v. Snow, 90
Tenn. 663, 18 S.W. 251 (1891); Ruffin v. Johnson, 52 Tenn. 604 (1871); Nance's

Lessee v. Thompson, 33 Tenn. 320, 327 (1853); Wilson & Whe'eler v. NgncY' &
Collins, 30 Tenn. 188 (1850); Stockton v. Murray, 25 Tenn. App. 371, 157
S.W.2d 859 (M.S. 1941); see

PATTON, TITLES

§ 121 (1938); 6 THOmPSON,

REAL

§ 3043 (Perm. ed. 1940); 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1331, (-rd ed.,
Jones, 1939); see also Costigan,, supra note 6, at 280-82.
22. 6 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 3043 (Perm. ed. 1940) and cases there
cited. See also Anderson v. Akard, 83 Tenn. 146 (1885); Augusta'Mfg. Co. v.
PROPERTY

Vertrees, 72 Tenn. 75 (1879); McCoy v. WillifQrd, 32 Tenn. 641 (1853),
23. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.69 (Casner ed. 1952); PATTON, TITLES
§ 121 (1938).
24. Kitchen-Miller Co. v. Kern, 170 Tenn. 10, 15, 91 S.W.2d 291, 294 (1935),

and Green v. Cumberland Coal & Coke Co., 110 Tenn. 35, 38, 72 S.W. 459, 461
(1903), are to be criticized for strong language in each case emphasizing that
the deed was champertous and "utterly void" without mentioning the: several
earlier Tennessee equity cases. See in particular Key v. Snow, 90 Tenn. 663,
669, 18 S.W. 251, 253 (1891); Nance's Lessee v. Thompson, 33 Tenn: 320* 327

(1853); Wilson & Wheeler v. Nance & Collins, 30 Tenn. 188 (1850)'; see also
Ferguson v. Prince, 136 Tenn. 543, 190 S.. 548 (1916); Stockton v. Murray,
25 Tenn. App. 371, 157 S.W.2d 859 (M.S. 1941).
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uncertainty is reflected in the two opinions in the subject case of
Young v. Unknown Heirs of Little.
In the Young case, Margaret Little died intestate, the owner of three
lots with a dwelling, and A. F. Littleton qualified as administrator in
1930. He also acted as agent for the collection of rents and accounted
to some of the known heirs of Margaret Little. But the taxes were not
paid for several years; and in 1938 the State filed a chancery proceeding, and the land was sold pursuant to court decree and bought in by
the State. However, Littleton continued to collect the rents after this,
and in 1940 he rented the property to C. K. Young and his wife. In
1943 Young made a contract with the group of "known" heirs to whom
Littleton had been accounting, designated as the "Grace Zeh" group,
for the purchase of the property. Up to this point, the Youngs were
apparently under the impression that the Zeh group could give them a
complete title. When they discovered that this was not true, they decided nevertheless to close the transaction with the Zeh group. Accordingly, they paid the delinquent taxes, paid the balance of the
contract price to the escrow agent and procured deeds both from the
Grace Zeh group of heirs and from the Tennessee Commissioner of
Finance and Taxation. They then filed the present suit to have any
claims which might be made on behalf of the "unknown" heirs of
Margaret Little declared void and removed as a cloud on their title.
While the Youngs were closing their transaction with the Zeh group,
Littleton had found most of the "unknown" heirs of Margaret Little
and had procured deeds of conveyance from them to himself, so that
his interest amounted to 2710/3000 of the complete title. The trial court
found that all of the deeds were secured by Littleton after he learned
of the deed from the Grace Zeh group to the Youngs; the Court of
Appeals in the 1949 opinion held that, therefore, the deeds to Littleton
were champertous and void. The Court apparently considered the possession of the Zeh group, and therefore the Youngs, as adverse to the
ownership interests of their cotenants, the "unknown" heirs, although
this conclusion would not seem to be at all clear. But the Court in
1949 went ahead to hold that Young and his wife had secured the
"entire fee simple title" to the property by virtue of the deed from the
"Zeh Group" and the deed from the Commissioner of Finance and
Taxation. Thus, the real property rights both of the "unknown heirs"
and of Littleton were cut off and eliminated. This result would certainly be proper if the decision was based upon the validity of the tax
deed purchased from the State. But it has never been a part of the
doctrine under the Pretended Title Act that a conveyance by one whose
lands are in the adverse possession of another causes a destruction and
elimination of the grantor's interest. Indeed, the Tennessee law cases,
as well as the equity cases and the authority elsewhere, have made it
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abundantly clear that, though the deed is void as against the legal
rights acquired by the adverse possessor, the grantor can always disregard his deed and sue the adverse possessor in ejectment in a court
of law. 25 In this respect, the "right of entry" of the true owner is
different from the future interest right of entry resulting from the
26
creation of a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent.
In the 1952 opinion, the Eastern Section of the Court of Appeals held
that, notwithstanding the conclusion in 1949 that neither the heirs,
other than the Zeh group, nor Littleton had any property rights in the
land, Littleton as grantee in the "champertous" deeds was entitled to
be subrogated to the rights of such heirs to 2710/3000 of the balance of
the purchase price on deposit with the escrow agent. The Court relied
on the equity rule that a champertous deed is good between the parties
to it and that the grantee is entitled to sue in the name of the grantor.
Insofar as the basic substantive concept of the champerty rule is
relevant to a proper determination of this case, the 1952 opinion correctly applied the well-settled equity modification of the harsh statutory rule. But it is submitted that the complete elimination of Littleton's property rights in the land accomplished by the 1949 opinion
cannot be justified on the basis of the champerty rule. On the other
hand, if the tax deed from the State was the sole basis for adjudicating
complete title in the Youngs, it is of interest to contemplate upon what
legal basis either Littleton or his grantors may be allowed to share in
the purchase price paid to the escrow agent. It would seem that that
sum was paid as the purchase price for the fractional interest of the Zeh
group. Probably justice was accomplished somehow or other in this
case, 27 but the application of the concept of champertous deeds for the
solution of the problem seems to be strained and somewhat confused.
Suits against the "unknown heirs" or other unknown successors in
interest to a deceased record title owner, such as in the principal
case, are in most states authorized by one comprehensive statute which
covers all types of actions for the determination of interests in land
25. Green v. Cumberland Coal & Coke Co., 110 Tenn. 35, 38, 72 S.W. 459,
460 (1903); see other cases and commentators cited in notes, 6, 7, 16, 21 and
24 supra.
26. The older traditional view has been that not only is the right of entry
for condition broken (called a "power of termination" by the American Law
Institute, Simes and other contemporary authorities) not transferable, but,
indeed, the mere attempt to transfer it results in its complete destruction and
elimination from the title. Board of Education v. Baker, 124 Tenn. 39, 134
S.W. 863 (1911); Newman v. Ashe, 68 Tenn. 380 (1876); See 1 AimucAN LAW
OF PROPERTY § 4.68 (Casner ed. 1952); 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 282 (1950);
3 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 716 (1936); Note, Alienability of Future Interests
in Tennessee, 5 VAND. L. REV. 80, 88-92 (1951).
27. Compare the consoling thoughts of Aunt Polly after she had walloped
Tom Sawyer for breaking the sugar bowl and then learned to her astonishment that Sid had done it: "Umf! Well, you didn't get a lick amiss, I reckon.
You been into some other audacious mischief when I wasn't around, like
enough."

CLEMENS, ADVENTURES

OF

TOm SAWYER 18 (1933).
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within the state. 28 While the Tennessee statutes are somewhat scattered, with possible distinctions between partition suits and actions to
quiet title and other types of actions, the statutory authority and procedure for bringing a suit styled in this manner and for service of
29
process by publication would seem to be perfectly clear.
30
The second case, Frumin v. May, further demonstrates the failure
of the Eastern Section of the Court of Appeals to keep in mind the
well-established equity modification of the literal words of the chainperty statute. One of the issues in this case was whether the defendant
had acquired title by seven years' adverse possession of a strip of 2.9
feet off the side of the plaintiff's lot. The defendant had fenced in his
lot and included the strip in 1937. The plaintiffs purchased their lot in
1941. In holding that, where a purchaser of land in Tennessee accidently or by mistake incloses a contiguous strip, believing he is placing
the fence on the true boundary, and holds the inclosed strip for 7 years,
his possession is adverse and will prevail over the true owner,31 the
Court went ahead to say that the plaintiff's did not acquire title to the
fenced-in strip, because it was adversely held by the defendant on
the date of their deed. "Under our authorities, this made complainants'
deed champertous and void as to the inclosed strip." It is submitted
that the plaintiffs had the same substantive right to challenge the defendant's adverse claim as their grantor had; and even a complete
statement of the champerty rule would not lend anything to the solution of this case.
The Tennessee Pretended Title Act was enacted in 1821 at a time
when it was of considerable interest to the State to assist its pioneer
settlors in getting their land claims cleared and protected against
eastern land speculators. In mid-twentieth century Tennessee, when
land titles have been evidenced for many years by tax assessor's plat
books and deed records, the emphasis would seem to have shifted from
possession to the reliability of record titles in order to make commercial transactions in land more secure.
It is to be hoped that in the near future the legislature will repeal
the so-called champerty statute. With the equity modification of the
literal statutory language redefining the basic substantive concept, the
statute itself can only be a source of confusion at best; and the equity
28. See 4

POMEROY, EQUITY JtURISPRUDENCE §

such statutes.

1396 (5th ed. 1941) for a list of

29. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 10388 (1), 10388 (2), 10388 (4), 10431-10440 (Williams
1934) for quiet title suits and quasi in rem actions generally; TENN. CODE ANN.

§§ 9175, 9176 (Williams 1934) for partition suits in particular. See

GIBSON,
SUITS IN CHANCERY §§ 196-200, 1042 (4th ed., Higgins & Crownover, 1937); 4
POmEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUCENCE §§ 1393-1399 (5th ed. 1941); see also Ray

v. Haag, I Tenn. Ch. App. 249 (1901); Creswell v. Smith, 2 Tenn. Ch. Rep.
416 (1875).
30. 251 S.W.2d 314 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
31. This point is discussed in the following subsection on Adverse Possession.
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remedy is likely to be an unnecessary procedural trap for the unwary.
Adverse Possession: Frumin v. May3 2 followed the recent Supreme
Court case of Liberto v. Steele3 in holding that encroachment upon
the adjoining land under an honest mistake as to the true boundary
line does not prevent the possession from being adverse so that title
will be gained after the requisite number of years. As pointed out in
recent reviews of this question,3 there is a split of authority on
whether the adverse possessor must actually intend to steal his neighbor's land. The Liberto case affirmed the earlier leading case of Erck
v. Church,35 holding that the Court will not burden itself by looking
into the possessor's state of mind to see whether he intended to hold
to the extent of the inclosure or only to the true boundary; and this
notwithstanding the later criticism of the Erck case in Buchanan v.
Nixon.36 While there are several states which hold that title by adverse possession will not be acquired if the adverse possessor intended
to occupy only to the true boundary line,37 Tennessee now seems to be
well committed to the rule of the Erck case that proof of intent to hold
adversely is not necessary, and apparently Buchanan v. Nixon will not
be followed. In 1946 the Eastern Section of the Court of Appeals stated
what the commentators regard as the better rule -namely, that, in
the absence of any proof showing that the possessor holds with the
consent of the true owner, a presumption of intent to hold adversely
will be made upon proof of exclusive possession for the requisite period.38 This eliminates the necessity for having special proof of intent
in each case and at the same time preserves intact the all-important
requisite that the true owner must have a cause of action against the
adverse possessor for the prescribed period in order for the latter to
gain title by adverse possession.
In Hutchison v. Board,39 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that
the statute of limitations does not run against a remainderman until
the death of the life tenant or until the remainderman has a right to
possession. This doctrine had been previously recognized in Ten41
nessee 40 and is in accord with the universal weight of authority.
32. 251 S.W.2d 314 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
33. 188 Tenn. 529, 221 S.W.2d 701 (1949), 3 VAND. L. REv. 337 (1950).
34. Note, Title by Adverse Possession in Tennessee, 5 VAND L. REV. 621, 631
(1952); 21 TENN. L. REV. 207 (1950); 3 VAND. L. REv. 337 (1950). See also Note,

97 A.L.R. 14 (1935).
35. 87 Tenn. 575, 11 S.W. 794, 4 L.R.A. 641 (1889).

36. 163 Tenn. 364, 43 S.W.2d 380, 80 A.L.R. 151 (1931).
37. See 4 TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1159 (3d ed., Jones, 1939); Note, 97

A.L.R. 14 (1935).

38. Gibson v. Shular, 29 Tenn. App. 166, 194 S.W.2d 865 (E.S. 1946); see 4

TnFANY,

REAL PROPERTY § 1159 (3d ed., Jones, 1939); Notes, 80 A.L.R. 153,

157 (1931), 97 A.L.R. 14 (1935).
39. 250 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. 1952).
40. Carver v. Maxwell, 110 Tenn. 75, 71 S.W. 752 (1902).
41. 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1184 (3d ed., Jones, 1939).
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Deeds CreatingTenancies by Entireties: In Hardinv. Chapman,42 the
Eastern Section of the Court of Appeals held that a deed to "H. H.
Brown and his wife, Mary Brown, equally and jointly" created a
tenancy by the entirety with its consequent right of survivorship. The
Court distinguished Myers v. Comer,43 where a deed to H and W,
"their heirs and assigns forever jointly and severally in equal moities"
was held to create either a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common, but
not a tenancy by the entirety. The Court also distinguished Faulkner
v. Ramsey,4 4 where extrinsic evidences was admitted to show that a
deed to a husband and wife "to have and to hold the said land ...
equally their heirs and alienees" created a tenancy in common.
It was once thought that a conveyance of real property to husband
and wife necessarily resulted in the creation of a tenancy by the entirety, the husband and wife being considered as a single entity with
the right of survivorship an incident of it; therefore, a conveyance to
husband and wife as "tenants in common" or as "joint tenants" was
nevertheless construed to create a tenancy by the entirety. 45 But in
Tennessee today, as in the large majority of other states, a tenancy in
common or a joint tenancy can be created by a deed to husband and
wife if the intention of the grantor to create such an estate is made to
clearly appear.46 However, if the deed contains no words describing
or characterizing the estate they are to take, an intention to create a
tenancy by the entirety will be presumed.4 7 It is said not to be essential
that they be described as husband and wife,48 and describing them as
such will be ineffectual if they are not legally husband and wife. 49 In
Tennessee, a deed to a named person "and wife" has been held to
create a tenancy by the entirety in the named person and his present
50
lawful wife.
Thus, it appears that whether a tenancy by the entirety, with its attribute of survivorship, or a tenancy in common will be created is
primarily a problem of construction. In view of the presumption noted,
if a conveyancer does not want a deed to a husband and wife to create
a tenancy by the entirety, he can create one of the other concurrent
tenancies by making the grantor's intention explicit.
42. 255 S.W.2d 707 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
43. 144 Tenn. 475, 234 S.W. 325 (1921).
44. 178 Tenn. 370, 158 S.W.2d 710 (1942).
45. Walthall v. Goree, 36 Ala. 728 (1860); Wayman v. Johnston, 62 Colo.
461, 163 Pac. 76, (1917); Wilson v. Frost, 186 Mo. 311, 85 S.W. 375 (1905);
Young's Estate, 166 Pa. 645, 31 Atl. 373 (1895); 2 AMERiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 6.6 (Casner ed. 1952) and authorities there cited.
46. Mullens v. Mullens, 161 Tenn. 165, 29 S.W.2d 261 (1930); Myers v. Comer,
144 Tenn. 475, 234 S.W. 325 (1921); Thomason v. Smith, 8 Tenn. App. 30 (W.S.
1928); See Note, 161 A.L.R. 457, 461 (1946).
47. Bost v. Johnson, 175 Tenn. 232, 133 S.W.2d 491 (1939); Myers v. Comer,
144 Tenn. 475, 234 S.W. 325 (1921); PATTON, TITLEs § 146 (1938).
48.

PATTON, TITLES §

146 (1938).

49. McKee v. Bevins, 138 Tenn. 249, 197 S.W. 563 (1917).
50. Ballard v. Farley, 143 Tenn. 161, 226 S.W. 544 (1920).
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Highways and Railways as Boundaries: An interesting question
concerning the ownership of an abandoned railroad right of way existing between a public highway on one side and a platted lot on the
other side was raised in McKinney v. Davidson County.5' In 1904 the
owners of a large acreage bordering on Nolensville Pike conveyed a
30 foot strip of land along their property to the Nashville Railway &
Light Co., reserving a right of ingress and egress and providing for a
reverter to the grantors if the railroad line should fail to operate for
30 days. In 1905 the owners platted the remaining acreage into a subdivision of lots, the boundaries of which were described by metes and
bounds as bordering on the railroad right of way. After several conveyances, the defendants acquired title to a portion of a lot adjacent
to the railroad right of way, and in 1942 the railway company abandoned its line. The defendants cleared off the right of way and used it
thereafter as a parking area for their restaurant. This was a condemnation suit by the county. The county was willing to pay the defendants
for 7 feet taken from their lot as platted. But the defendants contended that they were also entitled to be paid for the 30 foot railroad
right of way opposite their platted lot. The Supreme Court held for
the defendants.
Would the heirs and successors in interest of the original grantors
in the 1904 easement deed have any rights against the county under
the possibility of reverter reserved in that deed? When a grantor uses
as a boundary line a public or private right of way, the courts generally
construe the description of the fee to extend as far as the grantor owns,
subject to any existing easement, unless a contrary intent is clearly
expressed. 52 More often than not, land is divided by a right of way
easement, so that a subsequent grantee of the land on one side of it
will be held to own the fee to the center of the right of way. But frequently the easement is originally created off of the side of the
grantor's land, in which case the subsequent owner of the land adjacent
to the right of way will be held to own the fee to the entire right of
way.53 While the Court did not discuss it in the instant case, this rule
is only a rule of construction and will always give way to proof showing clearly that the original grantor who used the right of way as a
monument of boundary intended to convey only up to the right of
way.5 4 Therefore, if this rule of construction is applied to the conveyance of the 1905 platted lot, the defendants would seem to have
51. 254 S.W.2d 975 (Tenn. 1953).

52. 8 Am. JuR., Boundaries §§ 42, 49 (1937); 3 AmniucAN LAW OF PROPERTY

§12.112 (Casner ed. 1952); 9 C.J., Boundaries206 (1916). See also Nashville v.
Lawrence, 153 Tenn. 606, 284 S.W. 882 (1926); Vanderbilt Univ. v. Williams,
152 Tenn. 664, 280 S.W. 689 (1926); Reeves v. Allen, 101 Tenn. 412, 47 S.W.
495 (1898); Iron Mountain R.R. v. Bingham, 87 Tenn. 522, 11 S.W. 705 (1889).
53. 3 A-MEiaC LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.112 n.10 (Casner ed. 1952).
54. See notes 52 and 53 supra.
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owned the abandoned right of way as against the heirs and successors
of the original grantors. The Court rejected a contention by the county,
sustained by the trial court, that the railroad right of way had been
dedicated to public use.
Covenants Running With The Land: The distinction between covenants which are merely personal between the parties to a particular
deed and covenants which will be held to "run with the land" so as to
be binding on future owners of the land is indeed a difficult one. In
Lowe v. Wilson, 55 the question presented was whether the word "assigns" or other similar words must expressly appear in the deed in
order for the covenant to be binding upon successors of the covenantor.
The deed from the defendants to the plaintiffs contained a clause which
provided that it was agreed between the parties thereto that no intoxicants should ever be sold upon the lot. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment holding that the covenant was a personal agreement
binding themselves only and not a limitation or cloud upon the title to
their property. The Court, relying upon the 1916 case of Carnegie
Realty Co. v. Carolina, C. & 0. Ry.,5 6 held in accordance with the
second resolution in Spencer's Case5 7 that "since the clause here did
not specifically bind the heirs and assignees of the grantees . . .the
covenant cannot be held to run with the land."5 8 Neither the instant
case nor Judge Green in the Carnegie Realty case cited or discussed
Doty v. Chattanooga Union Ry.,59 an 1899 Tennessee Supreme Court
case nationally recognized as a leading case holding that a covenant
is binding upon the assignee of the covenantor even though the railroad was not built ("not in esse") when the deed was made and even
though the word "assignee" or its equivalent was not used.
Among the resolutions laid down in Spencer's Case was one which
asserted the requirement that, even though the covenant "touch and
concern" the land, yet if it concerns a thing which is not in esse at the
time of the demise, but is to be built or created thereafter, the covenant will not bind the assigns unless they are expressly mentioned.
A correlative resolution amplified this requirement by providing that,
if the covenant extends to a thing in esse, then it shall bind the assigns
without express words. 60 This arbitrary and artificial distinction between covenants relating to things in esse and those relating to things
not in esse caused considerable litigation in cases involving covenants
in leases. 61 But in the application of the resolutions in Spencer's Case
55. 250 S.W.2d 366 (Tenn. 1952).
56. 136 Tenn. 300, 306, 189 S.W. 371, 372 (1916).

57. 5 Co. Rep. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72, 15 Eng. Rul. Cas. 233 (1584).
58. 250 S.W.2d at 368 (Tenn. 1952).

59. 103 Tenn. 564, 53 S.W. 944, 48 L.R.A. 160 (1899).
60. 14 Am.Jm., Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions §§ 21-23 (1938); 2

AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.10 (Casner ed. 1952).

61. See note 60 supra.
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to covenants found in conveyances of a fee, most of the modern cases
repudiate the distinction and hold that whether a covenant runs with
the land is to be determined from the intention of the parties as disclosed by the entire instrument and not by the presence or absence of
the technical word "assigns." 62 In looking at the language of the instrument, the presence or absence of the word "assigns" or its equivalent may have a strong influence on the court in determining the
intentions of the parties. 63 But it is generally regarded as a mere rule
of construction and not a rule of law. Insofar as the Lowe case and its
1916 precedent require the use of the word "assigns" or its express
equivalent as a technical absolute, they would seem to tend toward an
unfortunate retrogression.
II. EMINENT DOMAIN
Damages: The general rule is that a landowner's execution of a
right of way deed or the condemnation of a right of way precludes
a subsequent recovery for damage caused to the remaining land. 64 The
theory is that the condemnation or deed embraces by implication all
damages necessarily incident to effecting the purpose of the acquisition
of the land. However, Tennessee cases in announcing the rule have
recognized an exception where a subsequent loss or damage was
not within the contemplation of the parties and, if advanced, would
have been rejected as speculative and conjectural. 65 In two recent
cases, landowners claimed to be within this exception despite the fact
that both had executed right of way deeds expressly accepting payment in full for the right of way and all damages which might be done
to their remaining land by the highway construction. In CarterCounty
v. Street,66 it appeared that the owner had no information when he
executed the deed that cuts and fills would be such that slides would
damage his remaining lands. In Morgan County v. Neff, 67 the owner
was not shown a construction plan and did not know that the county's
62. Doty v. Chattanooga Union Ry., 103 Tenn. 564, 53 S.W. 944, 48 L.R.A.
160 (1899) ; Purvis v. Shuman, 273 Ill. 286, 112 N.E. 679, L.R.A.1917A. 121, Anfi.

Cas. 1918D 1175 (1916); Sexauer v. Wilson, 136 Iowa 357, 113 N.W. 941 (1907);
14 Am. JuR., Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions § 23 (1938) and authorities
there cited;

CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RuNNING WITH LAND

95 (2d ed.

1947); 5 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 531, comment c, 554 (1944); Sims, The
Law of Real Covenants: Exceptions to the Restatement of the Subject By the
American Law Institute, 30 CORN. L.Q. 1, 30 (1944); Notes, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.)
185 (1908), L.R.A.1917A 127. Contra: Maryland & P.R.R. v. Silver, 110 Md. 510,
73 AtI. 297 (1909); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Smith, 72 Tex. 122, 9 S.W. 865 (1888).

63. See cases cited in note 62 supra.

64. Central Realty Co. v. Chattanooga, 169 Tenn. 525, 89 S.W.2d 346 (1936);

Hord v. Holston River R.R., 122 Tenn. 399, 123 S.W. 637 (1909); Fuller v. Chattanooga, 22 Tenn. App. 110, 118 S.W.2d 886 (E.S. 1938).
65. Hord v. Holston River R.R., 122 Tenn. 399, 123 S.W. 637 (1909); Fuller
v. Chattanooga, 22 Tenn. App. 110, 118 S.W.2d 886 (E.S. 1938).
66. 252 S.W.2d 803 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
67. 256 S.W.2d 61 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
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diversion of a stream would cut off her means of ingress and egress.
The Eastern Section of the Court of Appeals held both situations to
be within the execption to the general rule and allowed recovery of
damages despite the limitations in the deeds.
The Morgan County case is difficult to harmonize with the weight of
previous authority, since in it, unlike the Carter County case,6 8 the
subsequent damages were unforeseeable only to the owner who did
not see the county's construction plan. Prior statements of the law on
this proposition had indicated that the damages which may be recovered subsequent to a condemnation award or deed are those which
neither party had reason to anticipate. 69 The statement of the rule
in the Morgan County case may be traced directly to the leading case
of Hinckley v. City of Seatte 70 in which the Supreme Court of Washington held that, although a condemnation award is a conclusive adjudication as to "all matters that were, should have been, might have
been, or could have been raised in the condemnation proceeding," a
loss which "neither party had any reason to anticipate, and the possibility of which, if suggested, would have been rejected as speculative
and conjectural by the trial court, can now be compensated in damages."'71 A voluntary right of way deed has the effect of a condemnation
award and covers all damages to which the landowner would have
been entitled in a condemnation proceeding.7 2 The damages in the
Morgan County case were clearly not of the unanticipated and conjectural type referred to in the Hinckley case and decisions which have
followed it. Assuming that construction plans were available to the
landowner and that inspection would have shown no plans for bridging the channel, then this element of the damages would have been
available for evaluation in a condemnation proceeding. It would seem
clear that the county knew of these plans and may have bargained in
reference to them. Insofar as the case held that recovery may be
allowed for damages unforeseen only to the landowner, it would seem
to be an extension of the rule in previous decisions. 73 The case more
accurately seems to rest upon a species of fraud and concealment and
in effect would seem to place a duty upon condemning authorities to
apprise landowners of relevant details of planned highway construction before purchasing by right of way deed.
68. "The slides.., covered up to an acre and a half of plaintiff's adjoining
land, their magnitude suggested that they were not anticipated by either party."
Carter County v. Street, 252 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
69. Jones v. Oman, 28 Tenn. App. 1, 7, 184 S.W.2d 568, 571 (M.S. 1944);
Fuller v. Chattanooga, 22 Tenn. App. 110, 117, 118 S.W.2d 886, 891 (E.S. 1938);
18 Am. JuR., Eminent Domain § 369 (1938).
70. 74 Wash. 101, 132 Pac. 855 (1913).
71. 132 Pac. at 856.
72. Hord v. Holston R.R., 122 Tenn. 399, 123 S.W. 637 (1909).
73. But cf. Milhous v. State Highway Dept., 194 S.C. 33, 8 S.E.2d 852 (1940).
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Assignment and Sublease: The different legal consequences which
attach to a transfer by the lessee, depending on whether it is characterized as an assignment or a sublease, were involved to some extent in
two cases, one a federal eastern district case7 4 and the other from the
Middle Section of the Court of Appeals.75 If the transfer is an assignment, then the transferee comes into privity of estate with the
lessor so that each is liable to the other on the tenurial rights and duties
running with the leasehold estate, and the lessee is not the landlord
of the transferee. In this event, the original lessee no longer owes
any tenurial duties to the lessor, although he may be liable to the
lessor upon his contract. But if the transfer is a sublease, the original
lessee becomes the landlord of his transferee, and there are no tenurial
rights and duties between the original lessor and the transferee. In the
latter event, liability from the transferee to the original lessor can only
be predicated upon either the third-party beneficiary contract doctrine
76
or on a statute.
To constitute an assignment of a lease as distinguished from a sublease, the lessee must transfer his right to possession for the entire
duration of his term. While there is a split of authority on it elsewhere 7 there is one statement of the Eastern Section of the Court of
Appeals, quoting a Texas case, that to constitute an assignment the
transfer by the lessee must leave "no reversionary interest in the
grantor. 7 8s Under this rule, the reservation by the lessee-transferror
of a right of entry for failure of the transferee to pay the rent or any
other failure would make the transaction a sublease and not an assignment.
Because covenants in restraint of alienation, insofar as they are
allowed at all, are strictly construed, the distinction between assignment and sublease becomes all the more important. Thus, a covenant
not to "assign" does not prevent the lessee from subleasing;7 9 a covenant not to "sublease" is not broken by an assignment; 80 and a provision
74. Campbell v. American Limestone Co., 109 F. Supp. 741 (E.D. Tenn. 1951)
(opinion published in 1953).
75. Tennessee Handle Co. v. Builders Supply Co., 255 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn.
App. M.S. 1952).

76. Brummitt Tire Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 18 Tenn. App. 270, 75 S.W.2d
1022 (E.S. 1934); Commercial Club v. Epperson. 15 Tenn. App. 649 (M.S. 1932);
32 Am. JuR., Landlord and Tenant §§ 314-426 (1941); 1 AmERIcAN LAW OF
PROPERTY §§ 3.57, 3.61, 3.62 (Casner ed. 1952); 52 C.J.S,. Landlord and Tenant
§§528, 529 (1947); 4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 1693 (Perm. ed. 1940); 1
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 124 (3d ed., Jones, 1939).
77. See 1 AvRnicAx LAw OF PROPERTY § 3.57 (Casner ed. 1952) and authori-

ties there cited.
78. Brummitt Tire Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 18 Tenn. App. 270, 75 S.W.2d
1022 (E.S. 1934).
79. Gilbert v. Williams, 307 Ky. 638, 211 S.W.2d 829 (1948); see Note, 74
A.L.R. 1018 (1931).
80. Cases are collected in Notes, 7 A.L.R. 249 (1920), 79 A.L.R. 1374 (1932).
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against subleasing the premises is not broken by a sublease of a part
of the property.81 In Tennessee Handle Co. v. Builders Supply Co.,8 2
the Middle Section of the Court of Appeals approved the findings and
conclusions of the chancellor in a case which from the opinion would
seem to have involved these technical distinctions, although it does not
appear that they were called to the Court's attention.
The Holdover Tenant: It is well settled that the tenant who holds
over beyond the duration of his term may be evicted as a trespasser
or treated as a holdover at the landlord's election. But for what term
may the landlord elect to hold the tenant? In Campbell v. American
Limestone Co.,83 a tenant who held over after the expiration of a lease
for one year was held for another one year term. The federal eastern
district court followed the rule as announced by some Tennessee cases
that "the tenant holding over is held strictly, at the election of the
landlord, to liability to another like term. '84 Although the question
apparently has not arisen in Tennessee, a literal application of the
rule as stated would mean that a tenant for a longer term than one
year could also be held to another like term. It is doubtful if any
court would so hold.85 The majority of American courts hold that the
holdover period is determined by the term of the prior lease up to a
maximum of one year, and those courts which disagree generally say
that the period depends upon the way the rent is reserved in the
prior lease. 86
Rent Control: Marino v. O'Byrns8 7 involved a tenant's suit against a
landlord under the Federal Housing and Rent Act to recover alleged
overcharges. The premises were unfurnished and under rent control
when purchased by the defendant during the War. By virtue of
owner occupancy, the property was decontrolled under the act of
1947, as amended in 1948. Defendant made substantial improvements
during his occupancy and in 1948 rented the apartment furnished to
the plaintiff at a higher rental than its ceiling under the 1942 Act. The
property was recontrolled under the 1949 Act, but the landlord did
not petition the rent director for approval of the raise in rent. The
81. 1 AmxcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.58 (Casner ed. 1952) and authorities
there cited.
82. 255 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1952).
83. 109 F. Supp. 741 (E.D. Tenn. 1951) (opinion published in 1953).
84. Lewis v. Bringhurst Reid Co., 155 Tenn. 177, 290 S.W. 972 (1927); Hammond v. Dean, 67 Tenn. 193 (1874); Brinkley v. Walcott, 57 Tenn. 22 (1872).
85. See, e.g., Sinclair Refining Co. v. Shakespeare, 115 Colo. 520, 175 P.2d
389 (1946); Murrill v. Palmer, 164 N.C. 50, 80 S.E. 55 (1913); Parker v. Page,
41 Ore. 579, 69 Pac. 822 (1902). But cf. Weber v. C & C Dry Goods Co., 253 Ky.
439, 69 S.W.2d 731 (1934); Feldman v. Sheridan Warehouse Co-op Corp., 247
App. Div. 82, 285 N.Y. Supp. 1033 (4th Dep't 1936).
86. 32 Am. JuR., Landlord and Tenant § 940 (1941); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 335 (Casner ed. 1952); see cases collected in Note, 108 A.L.R. 1464

(1937).

87. 255 S.W.2d 720

(Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
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defendant insisted that the first rent charged after a substantial improvement is the lawful one until changed by the director. Although
recognizing that several state court and lower federal court decisions
supported the defendant's view,88 the Western Section of the Tennessee
Court of Appeals followed a decision of the Federal Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit 9 and held that upon recontrol in 1949 the apartment was relegated to its previous controlled status and the landlord
could not decontrol it by improvements. Therefore, the ceiling could
be increased only by order of the rent director.
88. De Antueno v. Agostini, 94 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Tomazich v.
Padis, 72 Idaho 77, 237 P.2d 1071 (1951); Lyon v. Thompson, 199 Misc. 527,
99 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
89. Forde v. U.S., 189 F.2d 727 (1st Cir. 1951).

